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THE PRACTICE OF LA\V BY LA1.rr\IEN 
AND LAY AGE~CIES 
FREDERICK C. HICKS0 ~.\....'iD ELLIOTT R. KATZt 
ADMISSION to the bar is by law restricted to natural persons of 
good moral character, who have passed an examination attesting 
to their educational qualifications and skill, and who have talien 
an oath to uphold the laws of the state and the honor of their 
profession.1 The practice of law by unlicensed persons is punish-
able either by fine or imprisonment, or both, either on statutory 
authority,2 or in the absence of a specific legislative prohibition, 
by reason of the court's inherent power.3 "Having power to de-
tennine 'vho shall and who shall not practice law in this state," 
said Mr. Justice Orr, "it necessarily follows that this court has 
the power to enforce its rules and decisions against offenders, 
even though they have never been licensed by this court." 4 Lay-
men and lay agencies cannot lawfully collect fees for performing 
legal services, 5 and legal proceedings instituted by them may be 
decreed a nul~ity." 
*Law Librarian and Professor of Law, Yale School of Law; author of 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1920), MATERIALS ~"D !liETHODS OF LEGAL RE-
SEARCH (1923}, !liEN AND BOOKS FAMOUS IN THE LAW (1921), and editor of 
HIGH FINANCE IN THE SIXTIES (1929). 
t Member of the Connecticut Bar; editor of the YALE LAW JOUR!\AL 
(1929-1930); and Research Assistant in the Yale School of Law. 
1 REED, PRESENT DAY LAW SCHOOLS (1928) 46. HOLMGilEN, RULES FOR 
ADMISSION TO THE BAR (17th ed. 1930). In some states graduates of speci-
fied law schools are not required to take bar examinations to receive their 
licenses. Ibid. For recent developments in Indiana, see Lrgislatm·c Acts a;~ 
Indiana's Ba1· Admission Problems (1931) 1'7 A. B. A. JOllR. 208. 
2 People v. Castleman, 294 Pac. 5:35 (Colo. 19!JO); In re Bailey, :.iO Mont. 
365, 146 Pac. 1101 (1915) ; People v. Schreiber, 250 Ill. 345, 95 N. E. 18!:1 
(1911) ("collection attorney'') ; Commonwealth v. Grant, 201 ?kiass. •itiS, 87 
N. E. 895 (1909); State v. Chamberlain, 132 Wash. 520, 232 Pac. 3:}7 
(1925); In re Walter Sjmmons, 15 Q. B. D. 348 (1885). See Note (1!:12·1) 
36 A. L. R. 5:33. 
3 Re ]Horse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 Atl. 550 (1924). 
4 People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 1'76 N. E. 901, 906 {Ill. 
1931). 
:; Hughes v. Dougherty, 62 Ill. App. 464 (1895). !liissouri allov:s a 
recovery of three times the fee paid to an unlicensed practitioner{ Mo. 
REV. STAT. (1929) c. '78 § 11694. 
G Stevens v. Jas. Smith Lumber Co., 54 S. D. 170, 222 N. W. GGS (1!:129); 
Gadek v. Kugler, 141 Atl. 561 (N.J. 1928); Kaplan v. Berman, :J7 MiEc. 
Rep. 502, '75 N. Y. Supp. 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1902). 
[69] 
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Despite such clear prohibitions, many unlicensed individuals 
and organizations are today performing functions heretofore 
commonly regarded as within the exclusive province of the lawM 
yer. In many instances they have been, and still are, aided and 
abetted by attorneys, either serving as employees or applying 
their skill as attorneys, to the organization and conduct of these 
lay agencies contrary to law. Without their aid, unlicensed law 
practice would probably not have developed into a serious menace 
to the profession. The camel having been allowed to insert its 
nose into the tent is now gradually evicting the present occupant. 
Lay agencies today actively competing with the legal profession 
include trust, title and insurance companies, banks, tax experts, 
accountants, collection agencies, notaries, and real estate bro-
kers. The field of the attorney is further encroached upon by the 
activities of arbitrators, workmen's compensation boards and 
small claims courts. The list is constantly growing. The creaM 
tion of Compensation Commissions in negligence cases, to operM 
ate somewhat like Workmen's Compensation Commissions, is 
being agitated. A prominent attorney has recently declared that 
"if the encroachments of the past twenty-five years are progres-
sively maintained for the next twenty-five years, the chief occttM 
pation of the members of the legal profession will be that of 
counter clerks for corporations and like institutions." 1 In a 
recent case the commiss.ioner's findings stated that a certain 
bank, through its real estate and trust departments had .,trans-
acted for its customers and others almost every form of legal 
business except the handling of divorce cases." s 
Some lay extremists might regard the elimination of the legal 
profession a~ not undesirable. Other laymen concede the desiraM 
bility of maintaining a body of skilled legal practitioners as memM 
hers of a profession, but contend that the lawyer's exclusive frauM 
chise is too broad. He should be limited to those functions for 
.which he alone has been specially trained, such as the preparnM 
tion and conduct of litigation. All other activities in which the 
lawyer now engages, they say, should be thrown open to laymen 
• Swaffield, The Destiny of the Legal P1•ofession (1931) 6 Los ANG1!1LEJS 
B. A. BULL. 103. See Bristol, The Passing of the Legal P1'ofession (1913) 
22 YALE L. J. 590; Dawson, F1·ankenstein, Inc., (1930) 19 AMER. MEitCURY 
274; Unlawful P1·actice of the I,aw, 6 Los ANGEJ.ES B. A. BuLL. 351 (1931}; 
Johnson, Economic Changes and the Practice of Law (1931) 9 CAN. B. REV. 
239 ; ibid. 284. 
s People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, supra note 4, at 90:3. A 
Florida Trust Company advertised "Specialists in Real Estate Litigation." 
Feibelman, The Passing Independence of the Bar (1931} 36 CoMM. L. J. 
227. In Georgia, "Legal Services, Incorporated" has just been organized 
to furnish attorneys and to render every kind of legal service except ap-
pearance in court. Lawson, The P1·actice of Law (1931) 36 CoMM. L. J, 
324. See note 35, infra. 
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and attorneys alike, letting the public decide by its patronage 
which should survive. Laymen, and especially corporations ha.v-
ing skilled staffs could perform these services in connection with 
their regular businesses more cheaply and efficiently than they 
can be done by lawyers. The opposition of the bar to unauthor-
ized law practice is regarded as merely a manifestation of defen-
sive guild spirit, motivated by a. desire to retain control of a. 
lucrative practice. It is unfair, they contend, to grant the at-
torney a monopoly in the law and at the same time permit him 
to compete in non-professional activities. 
To the above contentions, the lawyer replies that modern meth-
ods of transportation and communication, and the complex na-
ture of modern commercial enterprises necessitate highly in-
volved and complicated rules of conduct. The e}..-termination of 
the legal profession would not accomplish the object sought by 
eA'tremist laymen. There would always be needed skilled spe-
cialists, whether or not they were called lawyers. Obviously it 
would be better to have such specialists organized and under con-
trol so that the public might be protected from the charlatan, 
the unscrupulous, the ignorant and the unskilled. 
Lawyers further contend that limiting their exclusive fran-
chise to the preparation and trial of cases 'vould inevitably de-
stroy the legal profession. The immediate effect would be to 
deprive lawyers of the most lucrative part of their present 
practice.9 Strict economic necessity, plus the instinct of self-
preservation, would probably force many attorneys to ·abandon 
their professional ideals. The resulting cut-throat competition 
would deleteriously affect the administration of justice, thus de-
feating the aims of both laymen and lawyers. Of course, the 
lawyers admit, the bar has had, and still has, its shysters and 
undesirables, but fortunately they constitute only a small part 
of the profession. The growth of unauthorized law practice, and 
the fact that the bar is overcrowded have already 1·esulted in an 
increase of professional mis-conduct. Bar Associations are doing 
yeoman service in getting rid of undesirables. To this end, 
and to complete their control over their members, they are more 
fully organizing themselves, in some instances by means of in-
9 The effect of unauthorized law practice is already apparent. Nearly one-
third of the lawyers in North Carolina paid the minimum license ta." as 
having incomes less than $1000 from practice for the preceding year. lG 
1\IA.ss. L. Q. 50 (May 1931). A small Bost~n corporation advertised that it 
would engage the services of an attorney to look after its collection work. 
Nearly two hundred replies were received (including letters from graduates 
of high grade law schools, and men with sb;:, eight and ten years' ex-
perience) asking for salaries from twenty-five to forty dollars. Ibid. 37. 
"50% of the lawyers in Bost~n do not average $3,000 a year after their 
necessary office eA11enses are paid." Bantry, A Nw•spapcnna1t's View of tlw 
Profession., ibid. 43, 44. · 
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corporation with compulsory membership, and in others, by 
federations of voluntary associations. Competition from without 
the profession is making the accomplishment of these aims more 
difficult, if not impossible. 
Lawyers' misconduct in recent years has received wide public· 
ity conveying the impression to the public; of a degree of de· 
pravity among the members of the profession which does not 
exist. It should be remembered that discipline has often beon 
administered solely for the commission of acts which were not 
violations of the criminal law and which if committed by laymen 
would not have been punishable. The imposition of this higher 
standard of conduct upon attorneys protects the public. The 
lawyer contends that, even conceding that certain specially 
trained laymen could ably perform some of the acts now done 
by lawyers, there is no guarantee that all laymen who might 
hold themselves out as being qualified would be capable and trust· 
worthy. In the performance of these tasks involving trust and 
confidence, they are amenable only to the criminal law, in which, 
as defendants, they can avail themselves of constitutional and 
other defenses denied to lawyers in disbarment proceedings.10 
Opponents of unauthorized practice of the law consider the 
performance of such acts by corporations as even more objec-
tionable than when ·done by individual laymen. As the corpo-
ration is an artificial being, it obviously cannot satisfy the edu-
cational and character requirements for admission to the bar, 
nor can it take an oath and become an officer of the court subject 
to its discipline. As the attorney-client relationship is a purely 
personal one, involving mutual trust and confidence, it cannot 
exist between an attorney employed by a corporation and a client 
of the latter. The litigation would be controlled by the corpora-
tion which collected the fee. It seems inevitable that, when the 
interests of the corporation and the client happened to conflict, 
the attorney would deem his primary duty to be owing to the 
corporation which employed him, rather than to the client of the 
corporation. Whenever presented with the problem, courts have 
therefore held that corporations cannot practice law.11 The same 
:to See 2 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW (1914) § 886 et seq. 
u Without the aid of a statute specifically directed at corporations. 1\Iat• 
ter of Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15, 139 Am, St. Rep. 
839, 19 Ann. Cas. 879, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 55 (1910); In re Eastern Idaho 
Loan & Trust Co., 288 Pac. 157 (Idaho 1930); Grocers and Merchants' 
Bureau v. Gray, 6 Tenn. C. C. A. 87, N.Y. L. J., Dec. 6, 1915; 81 CENT". L. J. 
4 (1916) ; In re Richmond Title & Abstract Co., 2 VA. L. REG. (N. S.) 772 
(1917) (Opinion of Corporation Commissioner). 
Nor can a corporation practice dentistry or medicine. State v. Bailey 
Dental Co., 234 N. W. 260 (Iowa 1931); People v. Painless Parker Dentist, 
275 Pac. 928 (Colo. 1929); Winslow v. Dental Examiners, 115 Kan. 450, 
223 Pac. 308 (1924) ; Comm. v. Alba Dentist Co., 13 Pa. Dist. R. 432 
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result is achieved in many states by statutes, most of which have 
been passed in the last few years.12 In a widely quoted case the 
court remarked: 
"As it cannot practice law directly, it cannot indirectly by 
employing competent lawyers to practice for it, as that would 
be an evasion which the law will not tolerate. 'QuandQ aliqzdd 
prohibiter e~; clirecto, prohibit-ur et pet obliquium..' Co-Litt. 
233 .... Its [the corporation's] members might be without 
character, learning or standing. There would be no 1·emedy by 
attachment or disbarment to protect the public from imposition 
or .fraud, no stimulus to good conduct from the traditions of an 
ancient and honorable profession, and no guide except the sordid 
purpose to earn money for stockholders." 13 
Nor could a corporation legally practice law even if all the 
shares were owned by lawyers and it engaged only lawyers to 
perform legal services.14 The danger arises from the fact that 
if the shares were descendible by inheritance or purchaseable or 
capable of being hypothecated it might not be long before the 
corporation would be controlled by laymen interested solely in 
the making of money and not concerned with the administration 
of justice or the attainment of professional honor.1G The client's 
(1897); Atty. Gen. v. George C. Smith Co., Ltd., [1909] 2 Ch. 524; People 
v. Woodbury Derm. Institute, 192 N.Y. 454, 85 N. E. 697 (1908) (hospitals 
employing licensed doctors excepted). Cf. State v. Electro-Medical Institute, 
74 Neb. 40, 103 N. W. 1078 (1905). 
12 2 Ark. Laws 1929, Act 182; ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1929) e. 32 
§§ 411-415; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. (Marr. Supp. 1926) 55-56; MD. ANN. 
CODE {Bagby,1924) Art. 27 § 19; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) e. 221 §§ 46-47; 
MICH. COMP. LAws (1929) e. 197 § 10175; Minn. Laws 1931 e. 114; Mo. 
REV. STAT. (1929) e. 78 §§ 11692-11693; N. J. COMP. STAT. (Supp. 1924) 
§§ 52-214 p-r, (Supp. 1930) 52'-214t; N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill 1930) c. 
41 §§ 280, 271 a; N. C. Public Laws 1931, c. 157 §§ 1, 2; 2 ORE. CoDE A:m. 
(1930) §§ 32-504 to 32-506, 22-1213; R.I. GEN. LAWS (1923) e. 401, § G238; 
Utah Laws 1927, c. 78 § 345; 2 W.ASH. COl\tP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 
3231 (9) (applies to trust companies only) ; WEST VA. CODE (1931) e. :::0, 
art. 2, § 5. 
Several states merely forbid incorporation for professional services. Idaho 
Sess. Laws 1929, c. 262, § 2; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1930) § 8623-3. 
See HAWAII REV. LAWS (1925) § 3331 (Joint Stock Companies), 2 S. D. 
ColiiP. LAws (1929) § 8758. 
131\Iatter of Co-operative Law Co., supra note 11 at 483, 92 N. E. at 16. 
141\Iatter of Associated Lawyers' Co., 134 App. Div. 350, 119 N. Y. Supp. 
77 (1909) (all but five of the shareholders were lawyers) ; see State v. 
Ilferchants Protective Coop., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919). 
It has been reported that KA.N. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 17, 204 and 
NEB. Cor.IP. STAT. {1929) e. 24 § 901, permit incorporation by lawyers for 
the practice of law. Note (1931) 44 HARv. L. REV. 1114, n. 2, n. 15. 
These statutes merely permit members of the learned professions to in-
corporate into non-profit associations, e. g., bar associations. 
1s State v. Merchants Protective Corp., supra note 14, at 17, 177 Pae. nt 
~~ I 
HeinOnline  -- 41 Yale L. J. 74 1931-1932
74 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41 
intimate social and business affairs would no longer be protected 
by the attorney-client privilege, but would be exposed to the 
prying eyes of inquisitive shareholders.10 
II 
Undoubtedly lay practice of the law by individuals and corporaM 
tions is forbidden. Nevertheless, the problem remains of deterM 
mining what constitutes practice of the law, because laymen conM 
stantly maintain that acts performed by them do not come within 
the prohibition. When confronted with this question, courts have 
usually had to deal with inadequate statutory definitions merely 
forbidding laymen to act as attorneys, or to hold themselves out 
as such.17 Therefore, on account of tlie frequent recurrence of 
the problem in recent years, many states have passed fuller and 
more elaborate definitions.18 Missouri, for example, going ful'ther 
than most states, has distinguished between "law practice," and 
"law business" (office practice), both of which, however, are 
forbidden to laymen and lay agencies. 
"The 'practice of the law' is hereby defined to be and is the 
appearance as an advocate in a representative capacity or the 
tlrawing of papers, pleadings or documents or the performance 
of any act in such capacity in connection with proceedings pendM 
ing or prospective before any court of record, commissioner, 
referee or any body, board, committee or commission constituted 
by law as having authority to settle controversies. The 'law 
business' is hereby defined to be and is the advising or counselling 
for a valuable consideration of any person, firm, association or 
corporation as to any secular law or the drawing or the procuring 
of or assisting in the drawing for a valuable consideration of 
any paper, document or instrument affecting or relating to secuM 
lar rights or the doing of any act for a valuable co.nsideration in 
a representative capacity, obtaining or tending to obtain or 
securing or tending to secure for any person, firm, association 
or corporation any property or property rights whatsoever." 10 
Despite this recent legislative activity, the actual status of 
lay practice is not clear. No sharp picture of it can be presented. 
The best that can be done is to describe and comment upon 
16 Shareholders have the right to examine the books of the corporation. 
BALLANTINE, MANUAL OF CORPORATION LAW (2d ed., 1930) 545, 
17 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering 1923) § 1209 sub. § 13; 1 COLO, ANN. 
STAT. (Courtright's Mills, 1930) 130; IDAHO SESS. LAWS 19251 c. 891 § 6; 
. TENN. ANN. CODE (Shannon, 1918) § 5772; 2 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) 
§ 5345; VA. CODE (1930) § 3408. 
18ALA, CODE (1928) § 6248; 2 MISS. CODE ANN. (1930) § 3710; 1\IINN,, 
ORE., and Mo. supra note 12. 
10 Mo. loc. cit. supra note 12. 
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typical situations, such as those which follow, and to tell how 
courts have dealt with them. 
Appearances Before Judicial Bodies While anyone who has at-
tained his majority can personally appear in court to protect 
his own interests,20 it is equally well settled that no one can 
conduct litigation or represent another in court unless he is a 
licensed attorney.21 This ban is not limited to actual appearances 
in court but includes the preparation of w·rits, pleadings,~ and 
appeal briefs.23 
But the matter of appearances in a representative C..'lpacity 
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies presents a rather 
awkward problem. La:ymen are allowed to practice before Fed-
eral administrative bodies provided they have secured formal 
permission fro.m the particular body before which they are to 
appear.24 The Association of Practitioners before the Interstate 
Commerce Commission has virtually established a "bar" of its 
own including 1·egistered laymen as well as licensed attorneys. 
At a recent meeting of this group an elaborate code of ethics was 
adopted and a committee was appointed to formulate standards 
of education.2 t; In view of the highly specialized natu1:e of the 
2o 1 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAw, (1914) 27. Cf. Copeland "· Dabbs, 
129 So. 88 (Ala. 1930) (can prepare own conveyances). 
21 An unlicensed person cannot represent another in court as agent or 
attorney in fact. THORNTON, op. cit. supra note 20, at 28. A statute per-
mitting such representation if authorized by the "client" in writing was de. 
clared unconstitutional. l'ticKoan v. Devries, 3 :Barb. (N. Y.) 196 (1848). 
It has been held that a corporation cannot be represented in court e."cept 
by a licensed attorney. N. :r. Photo Engraving Co. v. Carl Schonert & Sons, 
95 N. :r. Eq. 12, 122 At!. 307 (1923) ; :Slack & White Operating Co. v. 
Grosbart, 151 Atl. 630 (N. :r. Ct. of Err. & App., 1930). Nor can a dis-
barred attorney, even if he is a sole shareholder, represent a corporation. 
Cary & Co. v. Satterlee & Co., 166 l'tiinn. 507, 208 N. W. 408 (1926). 
22 See Chautauque County Bank v. Risley, 6 Hill 375 (N.Y. 1844). 
2 3 Ellis v. Bingham County, 7 Idaho 86, 60 Pac. 79 (1900). Duystcr "· 
Crawford, 69 N. :r. L. 229, 54 Atl. 823 (1903). See Fallon v. State, 69 S. E. 
592 (Ga. App. 1910). Cf. Johnson v. Davidson, 54 Cal. App. 251, 202 Pac. 
159 (1921), and criticism in Note (1922) 10 CALIF. L. REV. 146. 
24 See In r.e Gibbs, 278 Pac. 371 (Ariz. 1929) ; l'tiulligan "· Smith, 32 
Colo. 404, 76 Pac. 1063 (1904) (land office). 
"An attorney cannot properly be associated with or employed by a lay-
man who is admitted to practice in the Patent Office, when that _layman 
does business under the name of a firm which represents itself to be 'attor-
neys' and 'solicitors in patent causes.' " Opinion 32, A. B. A. Comm. on 
Professional Ethics and Grievances, (1931) 17 A. :B. A. JoUR. 468. A lay-
man was punished in contempt proceedings for holding himself out as an 
attorney by inserting the following in a city directory: "--Attorney, 
Solicitor of American & Foreign Patt:nts." People Y. Erbnugh, 42 Colo. 480, 
94 Pac. 349 (1908). 
251 REPORTS OF ASSOCIATION OF PRACTITIONERS BEFORE THE I. C. C., 261 
(1930). See RULES GOVERNING THE RECOGNITION OF ATTORNEYS, AGENTS, 
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work, if the association succeeds in its objects, the public in· 
terests would seem to be just as well served as if their member~ 
ship had been restricted to duly licensed attorneys. 
In the states, no organizations of lay practitioners have been 
set up, and there are only a few decisions on the subject. Under 
the New York Tax Law, laymen having "knowledge of the facts" 
are permitted to make applications to the tax board, in behalf 
of third parties, for the reduction of assessments.20 Earlier 
ca~es in the First Department of the Appellate Division denied 
to corporations the privilege of filing such applications on the 
ground that being artificial persons, they could not have ''lmowl~ 
edge of the facts." 27 A later decision limited the earlier cases 
to those instances where a writ of certiorari was taken to review 
the assessment.28 But New York corporations offering to fur~ 
nish legal services in condemnation proceedings have been held 
to be illegally practising law.29 Some of the newer statutes, 
attempting fuller definitions of the practice of law, specifically 
forbid laymen to appear in a representative capacity before ad· 
ministrative bodies and officials.30 
Of coQrse a corporation can employ attorneys in and about 
its own immediate affairs, or in litigation to which it may be a 
_party. But at times the corporation employs attorneys to 'act 
both for itself and its customers. Trust companies employ at-
AND OTHER: PERSONS TO REPRESENT CLAil\IANTS BEFORE TilE BUREAU or PEN'· 
SIONS (1930). 
26 N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 61, § 37. Cf. Dunlap v. Lobus, 112 
Ky. 237, 65 S. W. 441 (1901) (layman can negotiate with tax commissioner 
for a reduction in the taxes of a third party). 
21 People ex rei. Trojan Realty Corp. v. Purdy, 174 App. Div. 702, 162 N. 
Y. Supp. 56 (1916); People ex rei Floersheimer v. Purdy, 174 App. Div. 
694, 162 N. Y. Supp. 70 (1916), rev'd on other grounds, 221 N. Y. 481, 116 
N. E. 390 (1917); People ex rei. Holzman v. Purdy, N. Y. L. J., Fob, 25, 
1916. 
2s Tanenbaum Y. Higgins, 190 App. Div. 861, 180 N. Y. Supp. 738 (1920), 
The preparation of an appeal from the Fire Department to tho Board of 
Standards and Appeals, has been held not to constitute practice of tho lnw. 
Croker Nat'l Fire Prevention Co. v. Harlem etc. Works, 132 Misc. Rep. 687, 
230 N: Y. Supp. 670 (Mun. Ct. 1927). Cf. Articles in N. Y. TUllES, 1\Iuy 
7-31, June 1-1'4, Aug. 5-22, Sept. 10-17 (1930), Mar. 5, Jl. 13-31 (1931) on 
practice before the N. Y. Bureau of Standards and Appeals by Wm. F. 
Doyle. The appearance before the legislature to secure a purdon has boon 
held n6t to constitute practice of law. Bird v. Breedlove, 24 Ga. 623 
(1858). 
20 Even though they hired attorneys to represent the owners. U. S. Title 
Guaranty Co. v. Brown, 166 App. Div. 688, 152 N. Y. Supp. 470 (1915) 1 
aff'd., 217 N. Y. 628, 111 N. E. 828 (1916); see Matter of City of Now 
York (Avenue A), 144 App. Div. 107, 128 N. Y. Supp. 999 (1911) 1 ajJ'cl., 
204 N. Y. 625, 97 N. E. 1103 (1912) ; Matter of Bensel, 68 1\Iisc. Rep. 70, 
124 N: Y. Supp. 726 (Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1910), aff'd 139 App. Div. 922, 124 
N.Y. Supp. 110 (1910). 
ao ALA. CODE (1928) § 6248; Mo., loc. cit. S1tpra note 12. 
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torneys in probate proceedings; banks and title, and mortgage 
companies employ attorneys in foreclosures. In some instances, 
attorneys are employed on yearly retainers, and all sums allowed 
by the court as attorneys' fees' are turned over to the corporation. 
A bank utilizing this scheme has been recently held to be prac-
ticing law/l1 The attorney so employed may be subjected to 
disciplinary action.32 Two of the more recent statutes specifi-
cally deal with the matter. One provides that attorneys' fees 
cannot be exacted in foreclosure proceedings unless an attorney 
who gets the entire fee, without sharing it, and without rebates 
of any kind, is actually employed.33 The other, in addition to 
this provision, makes it unlawful for a corporate administrator, 
executor, trustee, or guardian to do legal work in probate or 
other court proceedings unless through a licensed attorney main-
taining his own place of business and not an officer or employee 
of the corporation. Further, that no attorneys' fees are to be 
charged unless actually paid to the attorney without sharing or 
rebates.34 
Drafting Lega_l Instruments-Conveyameing and Title C(Y{J7.pa-
nies It is obvious that the practice of law is not limited to the 
conduct of cases in court.:3~ To-day a large part of the work of 
3 1 People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, supra note 4. 
32 ln xe Otterness, 232 N. W. 318 (Minn. 1930). 
33 N. C. Public Laws, 1931, c. 157, § 3. 
34 MINN. LAWS 1931, c.114. 
The ~Iinnesota court had previously intimat~d that corporations could 
-retain attorney's fees in foreclosure proceedings provided that they do not 
exceed the amount actually paid to the attorney as salary or result in any 
profit to his employers. In re Otterness, S1.1pra note 32. Cf. Report of Ccnn-
mittee on U7ilawful Practice of the Law, 12 N. Y. CouNTY L. A. YEAR BooK, 
(1920) 155, 177. Cf. Compromise Agreement in Ohio,§§ 6, 7, infra note 113. 
ss "It is too obvious for discussion that the practice of law is not limited 
to the conduct of cases in court. According t~ the generally understood 
definition of the practice of law in this country, it embraces the preparation 
of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and proceedings on behalf 
of clients before judges and courts and in addition conveyancing, the prepa-
ration of legal instruments of all kinds, and, in general, all adricc to clients 
and all actio-n taken for tlze1nin matters connected uith the laiv. An attorney 
at law is one vJlw engages in any of these branches of the practice of latt!. 
The following is the concise definition given by the Supreme Court of the 
United States: 'Persons Acting professitnw.lly in legal formalities, negotia-
tions, or proceedings by the warrant or authority of their clients may be re-
garded as attorneys at law within the meaning o£ that designation as UEed 
in this country.'" [Savings Bank y. Ward, 100 U. S. 195, 199, 25 L. Ed. 621, 
623 (1879)]. In re D\lllcan, 83 S. C. 186, 189, 65 S. E. 210, 211, 24 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 750, 753, 18 Ann. Cas. 657, 658 (1909) (italics ours). 
The only statement to the contrary is a dictum in Atlanta Title & Trust 
Co. v. Boykin, 157 S. E. 455 (Ga. 1931) that the practice of law is limited 
to appearances in court on the ground that most of the Georgia statutes on 
the subject had used the phrase "practice law in the courts." A more 
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the lawyer is performed in the office. The character of this work 
requires that it be performed by trained persons who may easily 
be held to account by the courts. 
" ... Very little can go wrong in a court where the proceedings 
are public and the presiding officer is generally a man of judgM 
ment and experience. Any judge of much active work on the 
bench has had frequent occasion to guide the young practitioner 
or to protect the client from the haste or folly of an older one. 
Not so in the office. Here the client is with his attorney alone, 
without the impartial supervision of a judge. Ignorance and 
stupidity may here create damage which courts of the land 
cannot thereafter undo." 86 
This necessity for trained individuals readily amenable to disciM 
pline is a forcible argument for prohibiting laymen from enM 
gaging in "office practice." 
The drafting of legal instruments is one of the important 
phases of such practice. In simple conveyances this work has 
become somewhat stereotyped and is often performed merely by 
filling out printed blanks. Because of this apparent simplicity it 
has been contended that conveyancing is a proper prerogative of 
laymen and title companies. While this argument is supportable 
in the case of simple conveyances, if there is a slight deviation 
from the normal set-up, the use of such forms may have disM 
astrous consequences. Legal training is required to determine 
whether the set forms are applicable, and if not, to prepare more 
specialized instruments. It is futile to argue that conveyancing in 
England was at one time the function not of attorneys but of 
scriveners, since the latter, although not attorneys, were licensed 
practitioners subject to definite rules and regulations.31 The same 
is true of the present-day foreign notary. While the matter canM 
not yet be regarded as definitely settled in thi~ country, it seems 
to be fairly well established that neither individual laymen nor 
title companies can engage in conveyancing as a business.no 
comprehensive statute is now being prepared. See What is "Tho P·l'ltotioo 
of Law" in the State of Georgia (1931) 2 GA. LAWYER 251. The last statute 
cited by the court that used this phrase was passed in 1847. Since thl.'n tho 
more general phrase "practice of law in the state" has been used. Tho 
opposite result has been reached in cases where the last statuto on tho 
subject' had merely forbidden unlicensed persons 11to practice law in tho 
courts." Grocers & Merchants' Bureau v. Gray, supra note 11; In ro DunM 
can, supra; In re Bailey, S1tpra note 2; see, People v. Schreiber, supra 
note 2. 
3s People v. Alfani, 227 N. Y. 334, 339, 125 N. E. 671, 673 (1919), 
37 CHRISTIAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF SOLICITORS (1896) 141M144. For 
those permitted to draft legal instruments in England, see 2 HALSDURY, 
LAW OF ENGLAND (1908) § 363 ( § 638, advising). 
as People v. Alfani, supra note 36. People v. Title Guaranty and 'rrust 
·co., 227 N. Y. 366, 125 N. E. 666 (1919) (bill of sale of personalty), For 
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Whether or not title companies, as an incident to their business, 
can draw legal papers is not so clear. 
Title companies perform a necessary and useful function in 
searching and insuring titles. Often they act also as convey-
ancers, through a representative, who may or may not be a 
lawyer. If, as is not uncommon, the parties do not employ 
counsel, the draftsman is placed in the anomalous position of 
representing three parties all of whose interests may be mutually 
adverse. The title insurance contract must contain all the ex-
ceptions necessary to protect the insurer; the buyer, ignorant 
of legal terminology, should be advised of any restrictions, cove-
nants or encumbrances which might affect the marketability 
or use of his property; and the seller should be fully apprised 
of everything which he has covenanted to do.33 One court has 
therefore refused to permit title companies to do any convey-
ancing whatsoever. "The argument that unless they are to be 
permitted to draw deeds and convey titles, they will have none 
to insure, is as specious as would be an argument that a fire 
insurance company should be allowed to make contracts to build 
houses in order to insure them." 40 In three states it is appar-
ently permissible for title companies to draft conveyances in 
those instances in which they have either searched or insured 
the title. But in only one can they make a business of drafting 
legal instruments, or hold themselves out as qualified to do so.n 
an example of the disastrous consequences which may result from con-
veyancing by laymen, see Cohen, Lay Practice of the Law Injures Clients, 
not the Legal Profession (Aug. 1921) 5 .Arlr. Jun. Soc. Joun. 52. 
39 Report of Co-mmiUee on Umaw/ul P·ractice of the Law, 13 N. Y. 
CoUNTY L.A. YEAR BOOK (1921) 169, 176. 
For example, in one instance, when a title company prepared a deed, it 
contained provisions that the premises were conveyed subject to building 
restrictions and regulations adopted by the city authorities (a matter 
subject to frequent litigation) ; and that the purchase-money mortgage 
should contain a clause subordinating the same to the first mortgage on 
the premises or to any new mortgage which might be raised to tnke the 
place of the first mortgage. None of these matters had been discussed. 
The vendor's oral promise to bear the assessment for a street which was 
to be opened through the property was not included in the deed. There was 
also included: "The seller shall give and the purchaser shall accept a titl~ 
such as th Company will approve and insure.'' The validity of this 
clause has also been frequently litigated. Whether or not these provisions 
were unjust or improper, it would seem that both vendor and purchaser· 
niight have profited by independent legal advice. See di~sent, People v. 
Title Guaranty and Trust Co., 191 App. Div. 165, 167, 181 N. Y. Supp. 52, 
53 (1929). 
4 0 Gauler v. Solicitors' Loan and Trust Co., 9 Pa. C. C. R. 634, 035 
(1891). 
41 N. Y. PENAL LAw 271-a; N.J. COMP. STAT. (Supp. 1930) 52-214 t. The 
latter statute also permits real estate brokers and money lenders to do. 
such conveyancing as is incidental to their business. In Georgia, title com-
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Neither laymen nor lay agencies can draft for third parties 
wills,42 contracts and similar agreements securing legal rights.43 
As expressed by one court: 
" ... Where an instrument is to be shaped from a mass of facts 
and conditions, the legal effect of which must be carefully deter-
mined by a mind trained in the existing laws in order to insure 
a specific result and guard against others, more than the lmowl-
edge of the layman is required." 44 
The organization of corporations, and the drafting of the 
necessary papers has also been considered to be practice of law 
even though such work has apparently become so' simplified that 
laymen can fill out the forms "sometimes without untoward con-
sequences." Statutes must be construed, the corporation must 
be so organized that it may best meet the needs of the projectors, 
and all proper papers must be drawn.45 "All this calls for the 
panies can apparently do all conveyancing. Atlanta Title and Trust Co. v. 
Boykin, supra note 35. Several of the other statutes forbidding corporate 
practice of law provide that the statutes shall not apply to corporations 
lawfully engaged in the examination and insuring of titles to real property. 
ARK~ LA:, MASS., MICH., R. I., WEST VA., loc. cit. supra note 12. Thi!SO 
statute's are not intended to permit such corporations to practice law. They 
merely permit the examination and insuring of titles. Whether or not 
the company will be permitted to do conveyancing in those instances in 
which it insures the title would seem to depend upon whether tho court 
regards such conveyancing as being a necessary incident to tho company's 
"legitimate business." See People v. Title Guaranty & Trust Co., mtpl'Ct 
note 38. (the conviction was reversed on the ground that the case moroly 
established an isolated act). Report of Committee on Unlawful Pntotio£'1 
12 N. Y. COUNTY L. A. YEAR BOOK (1920) 155, 168; cf, People v. Title 
Guaranty and Trust Co., 230 N. Y. 578, 130 N. E. 901 (1920), 
In one state title companies can make abstracts or certifications of title 
only when they act through licensed attorneys, or their principal offi('ors. 2 
MISS. CODE ANN. (1930) § 3710. 
42 In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., supra note 11. People v. Peoples 
Trust Co., 180 App. Div. 494, 167 N. Y. Supp. 767 (1917), 
By statute expressly: 2 MISS. CODE ANN. (1930) § 3710; and 1\IINN,, 
N. C., N. J., ORE. (Trust Cos.), WASH. (Trust Cos.) 1 all loo. cit. sllpl'Ct 
note 12. Other statutes merely prohibit the drafting of "legal instruments." 
2 MISS. CODE ANN. (1930) § 3710. 
4a Eley v. Miller, 7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N. E. 836 (1893) ; of, Barr, v. Car~ 
dell, 173 Iowa 18, 155 N. W. 312 (1915). 
44 In re Eastern Idaho Trust Co., supra note 11, at 159. 
4s Matter of Pace, 170 App. Div. 818, 156 N. Y. Supp. 641 (1915), Noto 
(1916) 82 CENT. L. J. 61; N. C. PUBLIC LAWS, 1931. c. 157 §§ 1, 2, Seo 
Opinion 31, Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 17 A. B. A. 
JouR. 468 (1931). A few statutes specifically permit corporations and 
others to furnish attorneys with information and clerical services concol'n~ 
ing incorporation, providing "the lawyer receiving the information shall 
maintain full, professional and direct responsibility to his clients for tho 
information and services so received." MINN., ILL., ARK., LA., loo, cit. 
·supra note 12. 
0 
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application of legal knowledge and skill and the consequent 
rendering of legal advice and services." <~G 
Wills and Trust Cornpa;nies Only members of the bar are 
permitted to draft wills.47 To be properly qualified to advise a 
testator, learning is required in such complicated fields of the 
law as perpetuities, trusts, and legal and equitable estates. It 
is also of the utmost importance that the testator should be able 
to impart confidential communications regarding his family re-
lationships to one who is under a duty to respect that confidence.43 
But service as administrators and executors is not considered 
to be practice of law,49 and trust companies often act in those 
fiduciary capacities. The number of such companies has in-
creased by leaps and bounds until to-day there exists a vast 
competitive struggle for corporate fiduciary work. Billboards, 
newspapers, magazines, electric signs, radios and other modern 
advertising media are constantly informing the public of the 
readiness of the trust company to act in the roles of executor 
and trustee. 
As an added inducement to the thrifty,, many trust companies 
offer to draft wills "free of charge" provided the company is 
named in the insb.·ument as executor or b.·ustee. Others have 
a regular schedule of fees for this service. Since corporations 
.cannot practice law, the drafting of such insb.·uments by employ-
ees of the b.·ust company is illegal.::oo This is true also when the 
will is drawn by an attorney who is connected with the regularly 
retained firm of legal advisers of the company.::;1 
The twenty-seventh canon of professional ethics adopted by 
the American Bar Association forbids advertising for, and the 
solicitation of, legal business. 
". . • It is equally unprofessional to procure business by in-
direction tlu·ough touters of any kind, whether allied real estate 
firms or trust companies advertising to secure the dl·awing of 
wills or offering retainers influenced by the lawyer •.•• " :;;z 
,w Matter of Pace, supra note 45, at 826, 156 N. Y. Supp. at 646. 
47 Supra note 42. 
4S See People v. Peoples Trust Co., supra note 42, at 497, 167 N. Y. Supp. 
at 769. 
An ex-notary, and e.'>:-bank cashier tells of the disastrous consequences and 
years of litigation resulting from the fact that he had drafted n will im-
properly. Jones, How I Drew Old Tom, Lather's Will, (1920) 91 CENT. L. 
J.l18. 
49 Metcalfe v. Bradshaw, 145 ill. 124, 33 N. E. 1116 (1893). 
~o Supra note 42. 
51 People v. Peoples .Trust Co., supra note 42 (no charge had been made 
either by the corporation or the attorney for services in advising, drafting 
and supervising the e.'>:ecution of the instrument). 
s2 See also Canon 28. 
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Obviously a lawyer would be disciplined if he secured clients by 
advertising his skill in probate matters and in the drawing of 
deeds and trust agreements. The same result would follow if 
he secured this business by means of solicitors, runners, or sales~ 
men. Likewise, he would be violating this canon were he to ad~ 
vertise that he would charge no fees for drawing wills if he were 
named as executor or trustee. He ought not to be allowed to 
escape discipline when the solicitation is done by a corporation. 
It is immaterial that he receives his compensation in the form 
of a salary rather than as fees paid directly by the client. r.n 
"A man cannot serve two masters" and serve both of them 
well. Courts have always been extremely watchful to detect 
the slightest possibility of an adverse interest in those people 
who help the testator execute his -\vill. This is clearly demon~ 
strated by the fact that one who merely performs the ministerial 
act of signing his name to a will as a witness is not permitted to 
receive any bequests under the will. 54 It would seem to follow, 
a fortiOri, that the person under whose advice and guidance 
the will is made should be required to be completely disinterested. 
It is obvious that the salaried employee of the trust company 
cannot be completely disinterested. At times the best interests 
of the testator are served by an outright disposition of his estate, 
but then there are no trustee's fees. Circumstances might make 
it desirable that there be two trustees, but in that event the 
company would have to share the fees with another. It is often 
in the client's interest that the trust be of short duration, but 
those which endure over a long period of years are most profit~ 
able to the fiduciary. The client's interest might demand that 
the powers of the trustee be rather limited, but the company 
wants them as broad as possible. It is in the interest of the 
trust company that a provision be inserted making it liable only 
for actual misfeasance or gross negligence, while the client's 
interest might demand that the trustee be held to a high degree 
of care. 
The trust officer is thus placed in an awkward position. His 
salary is directly or indirectly dependent upon the amount of 
sa Lawyers, whether officers of the company or not, who take part in such 
advertisement or solicitation; or who give legal advice in connection with 
wills and trust instruments to patrons who have been secured by such 
:solicitation; or who take part in the preparation of such instruments for 
patrons secured by such solicitation are violating canon 27. Lotter from 
Howe, Chm'n. of Committee of Professional Ethics (A. B. A.) printed in 
McCullen, infra note 55. Crosby, The Unlawful Practice of Tlto Law 
(1929) 2 CAL B. PROCEEDINGS 124. See also Opinion VIII of this com• 
mittee, 50 A. B. A. Rep. 518 (1925); and Opinion X, 52 ibid. 357 (1027); 
Note (1914) 79 CENT. L. J. 111; Joint Statement of Bar Associations, N. 
Y. L. J., May 12, 1931. 
54 PAGE, WILLS (2d ed., 1926) § 303 et seq. 
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trust business which he secures. As a conscientious employee he 
will try to further its interests whenever possible. It is a rather 
unusual man who under such circumstances solely considers the 
interests of the testator. And even such conscientious men, 
trained in the trust company atmosphere and possibly having 
exaggerated .ideas of the advantages of trusts and corporate 
fiduciaries, might easily convince themselves that the interests 
of the client and of the company were identical. 
In some companies, the trust officer advises the prospective 
testator and then drafts the will himself. In others, the v.ill is 
drawn by a member of the company's staff of attorneys. Some-
times, the testator is advised to consult his own attorney. Often 
this advice, given in an off-hand manner while the details of 
the testament are being considered, is overlooked. Continued 
praise of the company's capabilities, and references to the fact 
that advice is given free of charge, make recourse to an attorney 
seem unnecessary. If he is consulted, the attorney is often forced 
to approve the company's suggestions "or appear as a mere carp-
ing critic," since "the testator's mind and thoughts have been so 
filled with the company specialist's views, and he has been so 
thoroughly and completely moulded to the company's opinion of 
what is best for him, that he has not much patience with the 
views of anyone else." :;s 
The main advantage urged in favor of the corporate trustee 
is its permanency.:;s The recent failures of institutions whose 
position in the banking world formerly seemed as firm as the 
1·ock of Gibraltar, have served to lessen the force of this argu-
ment.57 It is also true that the welfare of an estate is often best 
promoted by joining an individual as co-trustee with the com-
pany.58 This individual would normally be the test.'1tor's counsel, 
a member of his family, or a business associate, with provision 
made for succession by another indhridual in the event of death. 
The individual co-trustee may not only serve as a check on 
investment by the company in securities in which it is directly 
55 IIIcCullen, Report to Bar Ass'n. of St. Louis Ccmccming Batiks awl 
Trust Companies, (Feb. 24, 1929) 18; See Report of E:-:ec. Comm. of B. A. 
of St. Louis on Unautlwrized Practice of Law, etc. (Jan. 13, 1930); Jack-
son, Competition and Coope-ration Betwem Bar and Coi7JOrate Fiduciaries, 
(1931) 17 A. B. A. JoUR. 656. 
56 Although trust companies are generally well managed, it is also true 
that some are mismanaged. See Letter fronz. a Trust Officer, 48 TRUST Cos. 
621, 622 (1929). 
5
' There were over 1,000 banking suspensions during 1930, and over G 000 
during the last decade. "One bank in five has closed its doors since 1920.'' 
Stephenson, High ll1orla1.ity in BanJ..-ing and the Remedy, (1930) 51 TRUST 
Cos. 739. 
fis The argument has also been advanced that the position of executor 
can best be filled by an individual •. The period of executorship is compara-
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interested but may also maintain an active personal interest in 
the beneficiaries scarcely possible for a corporation and certainly 
not to be· expected. The layman is prone to believe that his 
affairs will receive the personal attention of certain high officials 
in the company, whose abilities and business acumen he respects. 
The greater the amount of business entrusted to. the firm the 
more likely it is that estates will receive mere routine though 
careful attention, which at its best is probably no better than 
that which could be given by a competent individual trustee. 
The lawyer who has been advising the testator during his life-
time would seem to be the logical person to help administer the 
estate after his decease.~9 The likelihood of such a desirable' 
arrangement is at least increased, and the possibilities of cor-
porate abuses correspondingly diminished, when an independent 
attorney is engaged to draft the will. 
Mercantile and "Protective Associations," Collection Agencies 
Trade associations have performed many beneficial services in 
raising the standards of their respective industries and in ad-
vancing the interests of the group through cooperative efforts. 
There has, however, been a marked tendency in some of these 
associations to depart from their legitimate functions and to at-
tempt to practice law by means of their legal or collection depart-
ments. For example, an apartment house owner's association 
employed a staff of attorneys and offered its members the follow-
ing services : 
"Eviction of tenants at no legal expense; Legal Advice free to 
members; Collections out of Court at no expense to members; 
Collection through court-cost only one-fourth of amount col-
lected; other legal services at no expense to members." 
Despite the defense offered by the association that it was a non-
profit organization, an injunction was issued forbidding the fur-
ther rendition of these services.60 
Some automobile owners' associations offer the services of their 
legal department gratis to members to defend them in specified 
minor courts and to advise them generally as to the applicability 
of new legislation to the activities of motorists. Merely giving 
advice to members as to their legal rights in civil matters has 
been declared to be unlawful. In the same case, an association 
tively brief and losses occasioned by dishonest executors are inconsidcrnbl<!, 
Report of Comm. on Scope and Practice of the Law, 53 N. Y. S. B. A. 
REP. (1930) 432. 
no Ibid; Pugh, Strengthening the System of Personal Fiduciaries, (1931) 
17 A. B. A. JOUR. 575. 
oo Dworken v. Apt. House Owners Ass'n., 38 Ohio App. 265, 3 Ohio Bar 
Rep. 627 (1931). 
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which adjusted for its members claims arising from automobile 
accidents, by negotiating with the opposite parties or their coun-
sel, was held to be illegally practicing law, even in the absence 
of actuallitigation.61 
Some of the so-called trade or protective associations perform 
no legitimate functions whatsoever. They are either organiza-
tions inc01-porated by laymen to practice law for the benefit of 
their shareholders, or are organized by lawyers to solicit busi-
ness for them. A few associations were openly organized for 
the practice of law. The charter of one included the purpose 
"to operate an office or offices for the general practice of law in 
all its branches, to advise, assist and render all legitimate serv-
ices in all sorts of legal business." G:J • 
The following method of organization is typical of many of 
these so-called protective associations. A certain firm was in-
corporated "to collect debts due its members or clients, to em-
ploy attorneys for said members or clients and to pay for such 
legal services for and on behalf of its said members or clients." 
Legal advice and consultation on business matters were fur-
nished gratis to members at the offices of the association's at-
tomeys. Legal papers, such as notes, mortgages, deeds and 
wills, were drawn without charge except for the stenographers' 
fees. Members were represented in civil and criminal actions 
in police and justice courts within a certain locality. In quo 
~va1•ranto proceedings the firm was held to be illegally practicing 
law and fined one thousand dollars.133 
Another type of "protective association," offering the services 
just enumerated, utilizes the following scheme. It engages an 
attorney or firm of attorneys, and then solicits "memberships" 
at an annual fee, for example, ten dollars. The corporation re-
tains nine dollars and gives one dollar to the attorneys. One 
such association, when charged with illegally practicing law, 
contended that its sole function was to bring business men and 
e1 Dworken v. Cleveland Automobile Club, 3 Ohio Bar Rep. G4G (c. p. 
1931) ; Goodman v. Cincinnati Automobile Club, 4 Ohio Bar Rep. 257 
(c. p. 1931). 
The following letter appears in 2 CONN. MOTORIST 8 (July 1931). 
"G.entlemen: 
I take the occasion to thank the A.A.A. and t<1 tell its members of the 
efficient and valuable service rendered to me by 1\!r. , attorney 
for the A.A.A., in collecting damages frn· injm·y to my ca:r. 1\!r. . 
secm·ed a complete a?ul prompt settlement and sent me a chccl.: for the 
same • . • (italics ours). 
(signed) " 
&2 Creditors National Clearing House v. Bannwart, 227 Mass. 579, llG 
N. E. 886, 887, Ann. Cas. 1918 C, 130 (1917). 
63 People v. California Protective Corp., 244 Pac. 1089 (Cal. App. 
1926). The attorneys participating are violating the ethical rules against 
solicitation. In re Gill, 104 Wash. 160, 176 Pac. 11 (1918). 
HeinOnline  -- 41 Yale L. J. 86 1931-1932
86 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41 
attorneys together, since everything except the collection of 
membership fees was done by the attorneys. The court held 
that if the corporation was not actually performing the services 
offered, it was illegally soliciting business for attorneys, and if 
it was doing what it promised to do, it was illegally practicing 
law.64 
Since the extension of credit is an important phase of modern 
merchandising, an effective method of enforcing the payment of 
bad claims is essential. At first, practically all of this work 
was done by attorneys. But lay agencies have been so successful, 
and have multiplied so rapidly, that they have taken over a lnrge 
proportion of the collection business. aa Is this growth to be taken 
as an indication that lay agencies are more efficient than lawyers, 
or are we to attribute it to the fact that lawyers have been ham-
pered by the code of professional ethics forbidding the solicita-
tion of business? · 
The dictum of o.ne court was that the collection of claims with-
out suit constitutes practice of law and is therefore forbidden to 
lay agencies. It argued that when it is considered that the 
agency is: 
" ... generally entrusted with the evidences of debt, with 
transcripts from its clients' private books, with access to its 
correspondence, and further, that the statement of the case made 
by the client involves disclosures which ought to be privileged; 
when it is considered that the dunning letter is or.dinarily pre-
liminary to a suit carried on by disguised attorneys acting as the 
employee of the corporation; and finally, when it is realized that 
the money collected belongs to the client and ought to be subject 
to court orders in summary proceedings, there is good deal to 
be said in favor of holding that the operation of a collection 
agency, with or without legal proceedings, constitutes the prac-
tice of law." 66 
A contrary view in the same state had been taken in an earlier 
dictum.67 On several occasions, collection agencies have been held 
64 State v. Merchants Protective Ass'n., supra note 14. People v. Mer-
chants Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922), 
ss Unauthorized Practice, 1 GA. LAWYER 64 (1930}. 
sa See Meisel v. Nat'l. Jewelers Board of Trade, 90 Misc. Rep. 191 28 
(N. Y. 1915) ; Hittson v. Browne, 3 Colo. 304 (1877) ; cf, Moore v. Stasor, 
6 Ind. App. 364, 32 N. E. 563 (1892). One court has forbidden the sending 
of dunning letters by laymen with threats of adopting judicial proceedings 
if the debts ar:e not paid. Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Merchants' Credit and Ad-
justment Co., 4 Ohio Bar Rep. 239 (1931). The same result has been 
reached in Quebec by statute. Le Barreau de Montreal v. Sprague's Mer-
cantile Agency, 25 Quebec Cour Superieure 383 (1904) (61 Viet. (Q,) ch. 
27 amend., § 3562 a. S. R. Q.). 
67 Matter of Associated Lawyers, S'ltpra note 14, at 353. 
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to be illegally practicing law. But as in almost all these cases. 
additional factors were present such as the fact that the agency 
offered to furnish legal advice,68 or to draft legal instruments,0 
or to institute legal proceedings when necessary,'0 or to repre-
sent "members" in certain inferior courts, n these decisions would 
not necessarily prohibit the collection of claims by lay agencies. 
without suit. But the presentation of proofs of claim in bank-
ruptcy process, 72 and the preparation of assignments for the 
benefit of creditors 73 have been both forbidden to collection 
agencies. 
One of the serious abuses by such agencies is the solicitation 
of claims with which to force a debtor into involuntary bank-
ruptcy. By this means they often secure enough claims to en-
able them to control both the election of the trustees and the 
selection of their counsel. These activities have forced many sub-
stantial firms into bankruptcy because of temporary financial 
stringency.74 
While the collection agency is unhampered by professional 
restrictions in the matter of advertising and soliciting for 
business, it cannot 1·epresent its clients in court, since only 
attorneys can conduct litigation. The attorney, on the other 
hand, can avail himself of all legal process, but lacks the agency's 
Gs Grocers and Merchants' Bureau v. Gray, supra note 11 (the collection 
agency had been organized under a statute permitting incorporation for 
the purpose of conducting commercial, mercantile, and protective ngencies 
for the collection of debts and for the purposes usual and nppropriate tG 
the business of such agencies). 
69 People v. California Protective Corp., supra note 63. 
70 Bru..-ton v. Lietz, 136 N. Y. Supp. 829 (Mun. Ct. 1912) ; af/'d, 139 N. Y. 
Supp. 46 (the collection agency was operated by an individual and not a 
corporation). 
n State v. 1\Ierchants Protective Ass'n., supra note 14. 
72 Meisel v. Nat'!. Jewelers' Board of Trade, supra note 66. The court 
said: 
"The promissory notes required e.'ramination ns to e.xecution nnd the 
form of the signature, i.e., whether the maker was liable in nn individual 
or a representative capacity, whether signed in a trade name ns distin-
guished from an individual name, etc. Inquiry was necessary concerning 
the inception and delivery of the notes, whether for value cir nccommodation 
and as to any possible defense or counterclaim. Acting on this information 
the client would be advised whether to proceed. The neA-t step would be 
the preparation of proof of claim. This is a legal instrument and the 
mere fact that it is on a printed form and might be filled out by a layman 
does not change its character, any more than the £act that confessions of 
judgment, bills of costs, affidavits of service and many simple forms of 
pleading on notes and for goods sold and delivered nre frequently printed, 
changes their character .••• " Ibid. 25. 
731\Ieisel v. Nat'l. Jewelers' Board of Trade, supra note 66. 
74 Repcn·t of Committee on Unlawful Practice of the Law, 11 N. Y. 
CouNTY L.-A. YEAR BooK, 162, 165 (1919) ; Gambrell, Tile Practice of Law 
by Trust Companies and Other Lay Intc-l'csts (1929) GA. B. A. 222, 247-
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ready access to the public. Various ?rrangements for joining 
forces have been tried. The simplest of these apparently is for 
the collection agency to maintain its own legal department by 
employing attorneys on a salary basis.7o This should be regarded 
as illegal practice. It breaks down the attorney-client relation-
ship, since all communications are effected by means of lay in-
termediaries. It forces the attorney to divide his allegiance be-
tween the agency and the creditor. In addition, the court is im-
posed upon because the lawyer appears as attorney of record for 
the creditor while his real client is the agency. 
Another plan used by agencies when they are unable to collect 
without suit, is to transmit the claim to attorneys, who receive 
percentages of the fees recovered. One such agency charged its 
clients "a 10% fee on all claims before suit" and "a 20% fee ..• 
where suit is brought." The claims were forwarded to attorneys 
accompanied by the following: "This claim is given to you on a 
10% basis and if collected we are to receive one-half of 10% 
from you ... " One of these attorneys was held to have violated 
a statute forbidding lawyers to give a valuable consideration to 
anyone placing in his hands a demand for suit.70 
Still another arrangement is what practically amounts to a 
partnership agreement between an agency and an attorney, by 
which the former handles collections when no legal proceedings 
are required and the latter conducts any necessary litigation. 
One court has regarded such an arrangement as constituting an 
elusive attempt by a corporation to practice law under the guise 
of its attorney associate, and held that the contract between the 
agency and its customer was void as against public policy. Since 
the obligation was joint, that is, payments were to be made to 
the plaintiff corporation and the plaintiff attorney jointly, neither 
plaintiff, irrespective of the arrangement for the division of 
fees between them, could recover their fees from the customer.11 
ra The converse of this scheme is the operation of a collection agency 
by the attorney, sometimes under an assumed name. For practices in this 
connection which have been held unethical, see In re Rothschild, 140 App. 
Div. 583, 125 N. Y. Supp. 629 (1910) ; Matter of Thayer, 198 App. Div. 
311, 190 N. Y. Supp. 392 (1921) ; Matter of Schwarz, 195 App. Div. '194, 
186 N. Y. Supp. 535 (1921), aff'd, 231 N. Y. 642, 132 N. E. 921 (1921), 
In re Swihart, 42 S.D. 628, 177 N. W. 364 (1920); In re Dows, HiS Minn. 
6, 209 N. W. 627 (1926). 
rs Matter of Newman, 172 App. Div. 173, 158 N. Y. Supp. 375 (1910) 
(N. Y. Penal Law § 274). See A. B. A. Supplemental Canons of Pro· 
fessional Ethics, Nos. 34 and 35 dealing with division of fees and Iny 
intermediaries, and criticism of these canons by the Chicago Bar Ass'n. 
17 A. B. A. JouR. 418 (1931). 
n Midland Credit Adjustment Co. v. Donnelley, 219 III. App. 271 (1920) ; 
cf. Browne v. Phelps, 211 Mass. 376, 97 N. E. 762 (1912) ; Mciver v. 
Clarke, 69 Miss. 408, 10 So. 581 (1891). 
The association of lawyers and constables as partners in a collection 
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As yet we have no satisfactory statement of the proper rela-
tionship between attorneys and collection agencies.78 The latter 
flourish, and some of the former, having little k-nowledge of the 
propriety of their conduct, make all sorts of arrangements with 
them. 79 If the lay agency is to be permitted to transmit claims 
to attorneys, then some legitimate means should be found to 
agency has been condemned. Grievance Committee v. Clifford, 97 Atl. 97S 
(R. I. 1916). ' 
78 The Committee on Professional Ethics of the N. Y. County Bar Ass'n. 
had declared the following practices improper: 
"The division with the lay agency of fees for the lawyer's services. 
The guarantee by the agency of the lawyer's honesty or clficiency. 
The solicitation by the agency of the employment of its attorney. 
Compensation of the agency by the lawyer for its solicitation of claims 
for him. 
Furnishing such compensation in disguise by the lawyer charging its 
patrons less than his other clients for similar services, in order that it may 
be paid. 
A partnership between the lawyer and the agency involving the rendition 
of legal services by him. 
The receipt by the lawyer of compensation from the agency as its em-
ployee, for his professional services to its patrons. 
The offer of the lawyer's services by the agency to its patrons. 
The practice of law by the agency. 
The use of an officer of the agency as a cloak to enable the lawyer to do 
what he could not otherwise properly do. 
The habitual recommendation of the lawyer by the agency eo as to 
amount to systematic solicitation for him.'' QUESTIONS RESPECTING PROPm 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1929) Question 260. Cf. Questicm 51. 
Some of the opinions of the committee seem inconsistent, for e.'>ample: 
A, a collection agency, forwards a claim to B, an attorney on a '7% net 
basis. B collects and remits to A less the 7%. A remits to its client less 
10%. The client lmows that the claim was collected by an attorney who 
received part of the 10%. The committee considered this arrangement 
improper. Question 125. 
Question 220 is as follows: "It is the general practice for attorneys to 
receive commercial collections from collection agencies, and to the account 
so received, there is usually attached a schedule of rates ns follows: 'Fees 
net to attorney, 10% on the first $300, etc.' Undoubtedly the forwarding 
agency retains from this account remitted to it by the attorney an addi-
tional fee.'' This arrangement was considered proper if the attorney re-
membered that the creditor and not the agency was his client. Cf. Ques-
tions 260, 51. 
What if the lawyer performs the same memory feat in Question 125? 
What is the objective test? 
79 "Now in Virginia, such a decision would come as a distinct shock, 
for we suppose it is a daily occurrence £or lawyers o£ the higlu~st standing 
to receive claims from collection agencies and divide fees. The idea that 
this was unprofessional has never occurred to them.'' 2 VA. L. REG. (N. S.) 
865, 868 (191'7). The Chicago Bar Association has taken o. step toward 
removing this ignorance by the dissemination of pamphlets among the mem-
bers of the bar. See Report of Committee on Unlawful Pract-ice, ILL. B. A. 
REP. (1927) 261, 262; Chicago Bar Associatirut Code Defining Unautlwr-
ized Practice of Law, 6 Los ANGELES B. A. BULL. 159 (1931). 
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compensate it for its previous efforts to enforce payment. 
Disba1-red and Suspended Attorneys Courts have always been 
very hesitant to suspend or disbar attorneys because of the sever-
ity of the punishment imposed. 5° The person subjected to either 
of these penalties must therefore have shown himself to be unfit 
to be entrusted with the affairs of others either because of in-
sufficient legal knowledge or because of some character imper-
fecti6n. Since reinstatements are rare,81 the disbarred attorney 
has little hope of 1·eentering the profession. But the attorney 
whose license has merely been suspended will at some future 
date be reinvested with all the rights and privileges of the pro-
fession, provided that he shall have in the interim fully complied 
with the terms of the suspension order.82 Since he hopes to l'e-
new practice at some future date, he may be expected to attempt 
to retain his clientele, perhaps by resorting to improper methods. 
He is further confronted with the problem of earning a livelihood 
during his period of penance. Despite these temptations to ob-
tain the emoluments of the profession by means of some subter-
fuge or other, he must so conduct himself that there shall not be 
the slightest ground for suspicion on the part of the members 
of the bar or the public that he is practicing law.83 The reasons 
are obvious and grounded in public policy.84 
The suspended attorney must thus carefully refrain from hold-
ing himself out to the public as being qualified to act as an at-
torney. He should not encourage people to see him on legal 
matters or give them legal advice. He should remove his shingle 
and discontinue using his legal stationery. He should not permit 
his name to be published as an attorney in the city or telephone 
directories. These are affirmative duties, and courts refuse to 
so See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 354 (U. S. 1871). 
s1 Reinstatement proceedings have been regarded as applications fo1' 
admission to the bar, and not as applications to vacate the order of disbar• 
ment. Danford v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 303, 193 Pac. 272 (1920) • 
.s2 It has been held that a suspended attorney could claim the benefit of 
a statute exempting from attachment the "tools, apparatus, and boolcs/1 
belonging to members of the legal profession. McBrayer v. Cravens, 2GIJ 
S. W. 694 (Tex. 1924). Note (1925) 23 MICH. L. REV. 530. 
But it is generally held that where an appearance in court is necessary 
to the fulfillment of the duties of a public office (such as that of prosecu• 
tor) suspension or disbarment is a disqualification for the office. Danforth 
v. Egan, 23 S.D. 43, 119 N. W. 1021 (1909), Note (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 
796. But cf. State ex rei. McAllister, Atty. Gen. v. Sanderson, 280 Mo. 
258, 217 S. W. 60 (1919). But not where the incumbent is not required to 
by a lawyer. State v. Swan, 60 Kan. 461, 56 Pac. 71JO (1899); State v. 
Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91 Atl. 274 (1914). 
8a In re Lizotte, 32 R. I. 386, 79 Atl. 960, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 794 (1911) ; 
see In re Dangler, 205 App. Div. 94, 199 N. Y. Supp. 306 (1923). 
84, See Cobb v. Judge of the Superior Court, 43 Mich. 289, 2911 5 N. W. 
309, 310 (1880). 
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credit pleas that they have been violated tlu·ough inadvertency.s;; 
One obvious method of evading the suspension order is to 
secure· employment with another attorney. Another method is 
to continue clandestinely office practice and to employ another 
lawyer to appear as attorney of record, while the suspended 
lawyer does all or most of the work involved in preparing cases 
for trial, including investigating and interviewing witnesses and 
preparing pleadings and appeal briefs.86 Disbarred attorneys 
have also resorted to these e.'-1Jedients}17 
Since disbarment and suspension merely deprive attorneys of 
their franchise to practice law, they may, like anyone who has 
attained majority, appear in person to assert or protect their 
own rights.88 This right offers a convenient loophole to the dis-
barred or suspended attorney ·who wishes to practice law. By 
adopting the subterfuge of having his clients assign their claims 
to him for the purpose of prosecution, he is enabled to appear in 
court, ostensibly merely protecting his OVi'Il interests. 
In 1923, the California legislature attempted to curb this 
practice by passing an act which forbids a disbarred attorney 
to appear in his own behalf in the prosecution of. a claim assigned 
to him after entry of judgment of disbarment. The Court of 
Appeals for the First District held this act to be in contravention 
of the constitutional right to "acquire and protect property," 
since one acts as an attorney only when he acts for some one 
else while here the defendant was merely acting for himself.13(l 
In a later case arising in another district the disbarred attorney 
admitted that the claim had been assigned to him for collection 
for the benefit of the assignor. The coUlt refused to allow him 
to prosecute the claim and declared the statute to be a proper 
exercise of the power of the legislature. 
ss In re Lizotte, supra note 83, State e.'i: rel. Patton, Atty. Gen. v. Marron, 
22 N. 1\I. 632, 167 Pac. 9 {1917); State v. Richardson, 12:5 Ln. G44, 51 So. 
673 (1910); People v. Humbert, 282 Pac. 263 (1929) (disbarred attorney). 
sG These activities are punishable by disbarment. State v. Fisher, 103 
Neb. 736, 174 N. W. 320 (1919); Note (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 350. 
s• See Matter of Quitman, 152 App. Div. 865, 137 N. Y. Supp. 10G9 
(1912). 
A, an attorney, who was handling a case for C on a contingent fee, was 
disbarred. A arranged with B, another attorney, to handle the case. B 
agreed to divide his fee with A. Later the client attempted to substitute a 
new attorney. Both A and B, were held to haYe forfeited the attorneys' 
lien as the arrangement was regarded as violative of a. statute forbidding 
attorneys to split fees e..'i:cept with other attorneys. Dudnr v. 1\Iilef Realty 
Corp., 227 App. Div. 279, 237 N. Y. Supp. 499 (1929); Not{! (1930) '18 
U. of PA. L. REV. 1021. 
ss THORNTON, loc cit. supra note 20. 
s9 O'Connell v. Judnich, 235 Pac. 664 (Cal. App. Dec. 1925); Note 
(1926) 30 LAW NOTES 23. 
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"It is common knowledge that collection agencies pursue the 
policy of taking assignments of claims for the purpose of bring-
ing action, and that the only interest the assignee has· in the 
subject matter is a percentage thereof as his own compensation 
for doing those things ordinarily performed by an attorney ...• 
In substance then, the only interest the assignee or plaintiff could 
have would be the fruit of doing that which he is disbarred from 
doing, to wit, practicing his profession." 90 
Ambulance Chasing Ambulance chasing is a term applied 
to the procurement of retainers in negligence cases by means of 
personal solicitation or more generally, by the employment of lay 
agents, usually called runners.01 It is also a device which enables 
the layman to practice law illegally, sharing in the emoluments: 
of the profession without being subject to its duties and obliga-
tions.92 In recent investigations instituted by bar associations 
under the supervision of the courts oa it was found that many-
runners, not satisfied with being mere adjuncts to law offices, set 
up shop on their own account, soliciting claimants with printed 
contracts for retainers on a fifty per cent. contingent fee basis, 
with the name o.f the attorney left blank. In securing these l'e-
tainers they often claimed to represent a well-known firm of at-
torneys, which in fact had in no way authorized such represen-
tation. Some of these independent runners formed connections. 
with members of the bar whose names they used in bringing 
suit in cases which they were unable to settle without litigation. 
The lawyers expected to, and in fact usually did, take very little-
part in the proceedings, receiving a small compensation either in 
the form of a salary or a commission. At the same time that 
the attorney signed the writ he gave the runner an order for-
the discontinuance of the case. Complete control of the case 
was thus in the hands of the runner, who, rather than the claim-
ant, was the client of the attorney. At any rate the latter clearly 
had prostituted his office. The runner usually tried to settle cases, 
because in the event of trial, he would have to split his fees with 
an att6rney. Influenced by this fact, he often settled meritorious 
causes for much less than they were worth. Failing to make a 
settlement he would "peddle" the case around and sell it to the 
attorney paying the highest price. . Thus ambulance chasing 
oo Koepple v. Morrison, 257 Pac. 590, 591 (Cal. App. Dec. 1927); Not& 
(1927) 31 LAW NOTES 124. 
01 See -in re Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 222 App. 
Div. 580, 227 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1928). 
n2 See Alpers v. Hunt, 86 Cal. 78, 81, 24 Pac. 846, 849, 9 L. R. A. 483, 
486 (1890) ; State v. Kiefer, 197 Wis. 524, 529, 222 N. W. 795, 796 (1929). 
93 See People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, .248 N. Y. 465, 162 N. E. 487 
(1928) ; Rubin v. State, 194 Wis. 207, 216 N. W. 513 (1927) ; Petition 
of Childs, 26 Ohio Law Rep. 355, 515 (1928). Matter of Brooklyn Bal' 
Ass'n, 223 App. Div. 149, 227 N.Y. Supp. 666 (1928). 
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appears as one of the most objectionable forms of illegal prac-
tice.94 
ln8uro.nce Com-parn.ies JI.Iany insurance contracts incidentally 
provide that the company shall defend the insm·ed, in his name 
and on his behalf, from suits for damages.0~ The latter appears 
to be an agreement by a corporation to furnish attorneys to third 
parties, a service which in other connections has been held to 
constitute illegal practice of the law. Insurance companies jus-
tify this procedure by the argument that the attorne;ys are pro-
tecting the interests of the company as well as those of the in-
sured since the company must pay any judgment within the limits 
of the policy. They make a practice of defending in the name of 
the insured because juries, motivated by sympathy, might be 
tempted to disregard the real issues and grant exorbitant ver-
dicts if the insurance company were the defendant. Opposed to 
this argument is the fact that the company's attorney, whether 
he be a salaried employee or specially engaged for the case, is 
often forced to represent conflicting interests. For example, in 
one instance, the insurance company denied that the claim aris-
ing out of an accident was covered by the policy, but nevertheless 
undertook to defend the suit with the understanding thn.t it did 
not thereby assume any liability. Its attorney then advised the 
insured to settle. When, after the settlement, the insured brought 
an action on the policy the same attorney set up against the in-
sured, his former client, a provision of the policy that the com-
pany should not be liable except for the amount paid on a judg-
ment obtained after the trial of an action.oG 
Courts will probably uphold the contention of insurance com-
panies that they are merely protecting their own interests when 
they furnish the insured with counsel.07 This argument, how-
ever, is untenable unless the company is required by the policy 
to pay the amount of the judgment. Some so-called insurance 
contracts ·are merely agreements for the 1·endition of legal 
94 Shaw v. State Bar of California, 297 Pac. 532 (Cal. 19:Jl) ; Smallberg 
v. -State Bar of California, 297 Pac. 916 (Cal. 1931); Rcpcn·t of the Cam-
mittee of Censc;rs ro tlze Law Ass'n. of Phila., In re Continarut Fee 
Accident Leg. p. 6; Nationv.tide War on "Ambulant'e Chasas" (1928) 
14 A. B. A. JOUR. 561, 562; Aarons, The Practice of Lazv by Non-Lat~JCr:J 
(1929) 14 IIL\RQUETTE L. REV. 1. 
9~ See HUEB:t-."ER, PROPERTY INSURANCE (1922) 422. 
98 See Practice of Law by Insurance Companic:~, 13 BENCH h."'."D BAn 
(N. S.) 106, 107 (1918); Bristol supm note 7, at 593 ct. seq. 
97 It has been held that a corporation formed for the purpose of guaran-
teeing bonds and mortgages might properly employ attorneys to foreclose 
mortgages which they had guaranteed, since it was a proper party to such 
litigation. In re Kelsey, 186 App. Div. 95, 173 N.Y. Supp. SGO (1919). 
Statutes in several states forbidding lay practice of law provide that 
_they shall not apply to insurance companies. !IL\SS., !lftNN., N. C., R. I., 
supra note 12. But see note 41, supra. 
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services. For example, one type of policy offers to defend mal-
practice suits brought against physicians. The company agrees 
to pay court costs and to furnish attorneys but not to pay the 
amount of the judgment if any is returned against the physician. 
Some courts have held that such companies cannot operate with-
out complying with the insurance laws.98 Such decisions, how-
ever, are not determinative of the question whether or not such 
companies are practicing law.99 Obviously, no license issued by 
the insurance commissioner of the state would of itself entitle the 
holder to engage in the practice of law.100 One court refused to 
permit such companies to operate within the state on the ground 
that the services offered were legal services and hence could not 
be performed by a corporation.101 The mere presence or absence 
of a policy should not determine the legitimacy of the enterprise. 
For if this were the controlling feature, what would prevent a 
corporation from guaranteeing a minimum recovery in every suit 
for breach of contract, paying the minimum amount in advance 
under a guaranty which permits them to furnish lawyers and to 
prosecute such causes of action? What would prevent corpora-
tions from furnishing attorneys for the prosecution of negli-
gence cases by the simple expedient of selling "policies" guaran-
teeing minimum recoveries? 102 In brief, the "policy" could be 
used as a wedge for entering almost every field of litigation. 
Notaries and Accountants In many foreign countries the 
notary is a specially trained official, a sort of quasi-lawyer, who 
is authorized to draft legal instruments and give advice concern-
ing them. In this country notaries, whose chief function is to 
acknowledge instruments, are not permitted to practice law 
unless they also happen to be licensed attorneys. In cities having 
large foreign populations many notaries have practiced law by 
pretending to credulous and ignorant people that they are com-
petent to give legal advice and to act as draftsmen. Some nota-
ries have been punished for this illegal law practice,103 but convic-
tions are difficult to obtain because the victims usually speak 
os Physicians' Defense Co. v. O'Brien, 100 Minn. 490, 111 N. W. 396 
(1907) ; Physicians' Defense Co. v. Cooper, 199 Fed. 576, 47 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 290 (C. C. A. 9th 1912). Contra: Vredenburgh v. Physicians' Do· 
fense Co., 126 Ill. App. 509 (1906). 1 COOLEY, INSURANCE (2d ed,, 1927) 
124; 6 Ibid. 5621. 
99 See Allin v. Motorist's Alliance, 29 S. W. (2d) 19, 23 (Ky. App. 1930), 
10° See Townsend v. State Bar of Calif., 291 Pac. 837, 838 (Cal. 1930), 
10:1. State ex rei. Physicians' Defense Co. v. Laylin, 73 Ohio St. 90, '16 
N. E. 567 (1905). 
102 Report of Committee on Unlawful Practice of the Law, 11 YEAR 
BooK, N. Y. CouNTY L. Ass'N. (1919) 162, 169. 
103 People v. Alfani, supra note 36; Report of ,Committee on Unlaw/1tl 
Practice of the Law, 8 YEAR BOOK, N. Y. COUNTY L. Ass'N. (1916) 173, 
183. 
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English poorly and are too ignorant to appeal to the proper au-
thorities. In some instances the notary serves as a. soliciting 
.agent for a law office.104 
The Federal Tax Department has apparently authorized ac-
countants to fill out and prepare income tax returns for others. 
In the ordinary case probably little harm results. But in many 
instances knowledge is required of such intricate matters as the 
law of domicile, or the effect on taxation of increase and decrease 
of corporate stock, of merger, consolidation, incorporation, part-
nership and dissolution. Statutes must be interpreted, and cases 
must be found and construed. In this work a knowledge of the 
fundamentals of law is necessary. The superficial business law 
-courses usually taken by accountants are woefully inadequate. 
The normal function of the accountant is limited to the e.xamina-
tion of books and the preparation of schedules, and he is neither 
authorized nor usually competent to advise clients on questions 
of law arising out of the administration of the ta.x statutes.10~ 
III 
It is evident that many laymen and lay agencies are operating 
in the field which is and always should be limited to lawyers. 
On the other hand we cannot return to the time when theology 
.and law were the only learned professions. Laymen have right-
fully entered and cannot be evicted from part of the lav,.yers' 
ancient preserves. Til-advised and hasty attempts at retaliatory, 
prohibitive, and permissive legislation will only add to the con-
fusion. 
There is a narrow neutral zone in which both lawyers and 
laymen can operate. Failure to admit that this zone exists 
merely encourages the latter to "bootleg" all types of legal serv-
ices in the zone and beyond it.100 But the layman "practicing" 
within the zone should be subject to regulation just as is the 
la·wyer. Some types of practice should be permitted only when 
incidental to a regular business. Others should be permitted to 
laymen only thl:ough the agency of independent attorneys. "Then 
direct individual service is given licenses should be required, 
and granted only on proof of skill. 
1o4 See l\latter of Treadwell, 175 App. Div. 833, 1G2 N. Y. Supp. 5;)-1 
(1916). 
10~ Report of Ccmzmittee on Recommendati(nzs of tJw Confcro!cc of Bar 
Associations-Appendi."G A, 44 N. Y. S. B. A. REP. (1921) 287, 3Gl; Report 
of Committee on Unlawf'vl Practice of the Law, 14 YEAR BOOK, N. Y. 
CoUNTY L. Ass'N (1922) 172, 183. 
In some instances accountants have attempted to enter illegally the 
general field of the practice of law. Re Morse, supra note 3. 
1os See Ashley, The U1zautlwri::ed Practice of Law, 16 A. B. A. Joun. 
558 (1930). 
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For the delineation of the neutral zone further investigation 
into existing fact situations is first necessary. Many of the 
current assumptions upon which arguments are based are pure 
guess-work. To what extent are laymen and lay agencies giving 
legal advice and drafting legal instruments? How many lay 
agencies hire attorneys to furnish such services for customers? 
To what extent is litigation actually employed in the collection 
of claims? What types of relationships exist between laymen 
and lawyers and to what extent are they illegal or violative of 
the rules of professional conduct? How successfully from the 
viewpoint of the client do the activities of competing lawyers 
and laymen operate? These are questions, typical of many, 
which are worthy of careful research. 
In the meantime, even under present limitations of knowledge, 
some constructive measures can be taken. It is possible to elimM 
inate much illegal activity by authority of existing statutes. Tho 
offender can be subjected to fine or imprisonment. Offending 
corporations can be deprived of their charters. In two states 
injunctions against lay practice may be granted at the suit of 
attorneys.107 More effective action could be taken if there were 
a clear and adequate definition of the practice of law. Defini-
tions, even in the newer statutes, are usually in general terms 
and are not very helpful as to particular matters until there has 
been a clear expression of judicial opinion.103 
The above statements relate to' remedies by the enforcement of 
statutes. Much more can probably be accomplished by less drastic 
means. Misunderstanding concerning the status of fiduciary 
work by corporations should be removed. It has been suggested 
that if laymen are to be permitted to compete with attorneys 
for work of a fiduciary nature they should be subjected to the 
same or similar ethical restrictions, and be held to the same de-
gree of responsibility, as are lawyers. The right of ,corporations 
to act as trustees and executors is now well established in most 
states. It has bee~ contended that that right ought not to be 
accompanied by the privilege of advertising their abilities in 
these capacities since lawyers are not allowed a like privilege.109 
Mere business is not being sought, but the establishment of a 
relationship involving trust and confidence. These organizations 
do not merely praise the corporation as a fiduciary, but also, 
101 Ohio and N. C. See notes 60, 61, supra; Goodman v. Western Bank 
& Trust Co., 3 OHIO BAR REP. 609 (1931) ; N. C. Public Laws 1931, c. 157 
§§ 1, 2. 
1os Prosecuting attorneys have hesitated to prosecute. Beardsley, Lcty 
Encroachments (1931) 36 COMM. L. J. 275. 
1oo Activities of Banks and Trust Companies, 16 MAss. L. Q. 12 ct. seq. 
(Jan. 1931); 9 Ibid. 35 (May 1924); 10 Ibid. 11 (Feb. 1925). Slater, 
Corporate Fiduciaries and Legal Ethics (1931) 17 A. B. A. Joun. 441. 
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sometimes in scare-head type, disparage the individual trustee 
by over-emphasis on losses from inefficiency and fraud. At best 
this presents a one-sided picture of a clearly debatable matter. 
As has been shown above, the interests of the testator and his 
beneficiaries will often be best served by an individual trustee 
acting either alone or in concert with a corporate fiduciary. At 
present there is no agency presenting to the public this side of 
the picture. The individual attorney cannot do this, not only 
because he is expressly f01·bidden to advertise by the code of 
professional ethics, but also because his financial resources are 
limited. It has therefore been suggested that this burden be 
undertaken by the bar associations.110 
The ethical considerations underlying the rules forbidding an 
attorney to advertise or to solicit business are briefly as follows. 
Since he is an officer of the court, an aide in the administration 
of justice, advertising his readiness to do justice would be un-
dignified and incongruous. It would also tend to stir up litiga-
tion based on frivolous and fraudulent claims unfairly burden-
some to defendants and tending to glut court calendars. The 
lawyer has no wares to offer like a shop-keeper, his stock in trade 
consisting only of his skill and trustworthiness. None of these 
objections would seen to be valid against advertising in the gen-
eral interests of the profession by bar associations. A weakness 
of this plan is that bar associations are at present financially 
unprepared to compete with the expensive advertising campaigns 
carried on by corporate fiduciaries. It may nevertheless be pos-
sible to secure effective publicity by the publication of short and 
dignified articles in leading periodicals and in local magazines 
throughout the country. An alternative to advertising by bar 
associations is the enactment of statutes forbidding corporations 
to advertise themselves as fiduciaries. Such a statute has been 
proposed in l\:Iassachusetts.111 A practical objection to the plan 
is the virtual impossibility of securing such legislation over 
the powerful lobbying influences of the corporate fiduciaries. 
The conflict of interests between lawyers and laymen in regard 
to law practice may largely be removed by cooperation, confer-
ences and mutual agreements conscientiously observed. Far-
seeing and progressive corporation officials realize the impor-
tance of retaining the good will of attorneys. The latter have 
much to gain by friendly contact with corporations. In neither 
case is the attitude altruistic, because both derive lucrative busi-
ness from the relationship. A case in point is cooperation be-
tween bar associations and trust company officials. Some of the 
110 Collective Advertising of the Bar by Bar Associations, 15 !'IL\ss. L. Q. 
61 (May 1930). 
m House Bill No. 499, 16 MAss. L. Q. 43 (Jan., 1931); see note 109, 
supra. 
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latter concede that corporate practice of the law is fundamentally 
unsound and subversive of the best interests of the public, but 
they contend that a clear delimitation of the prohibited field 
is essential.112 Steps in this direction have recently been taken 
through the efforts of the Trust Companies Division of the 
American Bankers Association in cooperation with local bar 
associations. The result in one instance which may be taken as 
typical was the adoption of codes, specially dealing with the 
problem, by the Ohio Bankers Association and the Ohio Bar 
Association.113 These are worthy of quotation in full: 
Code for Banks and Trust Companies 
"First. A bank should not advertise that it maintains a Legal Depart· 
ment .. 
"Second. A bank should not through an officer, employee, or other per· 
son employed for that service, draw wills except in cases in which tho 
will-maker is also represented by a lawyer employed by him. A bank should 
not employ solicitors to persuade persons to have their wills drawn by 
an officer or an employee of a bank. 
· "Third. A bank should endeavor to cause the client of its trust depart· 
ment to consult with legal counsel of his own in connection with any 
matter of a fiduciary nature. 
"Fourth. A bank should not prepare any legal instrument in any 
transaction to which it is not a party. 
"Fifth. A bank should not prepare forms for nor minutes of corporate 
proceedings in which it is not interested. A bank should not draw leases, 
contracts, deeds, mortgages and other legal documents in matters in which 
it has no interest unless it performs some act or function in connection 
therewith. 
"Sixth. No bank or trust company or trust officer shall be paid for or 
receive compensation for services as counsel to any trust estate for which 
such bank is trustee. Such services as counsel are taken to include appear• 
ances in court, the preparation of instruments by the trust officer or giving 
of advice upon legal matters by said trust officer. 
"Seventh. Where a bank or trust company charges and collects from 
a mortgage loan borrower an attorney fee for examination of title or nb· 
stract 'in connection with a mortgage loan, no part of such attorney fee 
should be retained by the bank or trust company. 
"Eighth. Where reports by titles or abstracts are furnished to a bank 
or trust company by an abstract or title company in connection with a real 
estate mortgage loan, the charge made to the borrower for such service 
rendered by said abstract or title company should not be designated as 
attorney fees or trust charges." 
112 Griswold, Some Aspects of the Relationship between Trust Compctnies 
and the Legal Profession (1929), 48 TRUST Cos. 409, '753; A Letter from ct 
Trust Officer, ibid. 621. 
113 lbid. 914; The Jamestown (N. Y.) Code, 4'7 ibid. '7'79; The Buffalo 
Code, 51 ibid. 1'73 (1930); lVfissouri, ibid. 1'75; The Baltimore Code, 6 Los 
ANGELES BAR BULL. 309 (1931) ; NEW ORLEANS BAR BULL. See Griswold, 
Fostering Cooperation with Lawyers (1930), 51 TRUST Cos. 609; Brnd· 
shaw, Vindication of Lawyer-Trust Company Cooperation in Washington, 
ibid. 159. 
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Code for Lawyers 
"Fi:rst. The members of the Bar, recognizing the legal capacity of the 
trust departments of banks to administer estates, and conduct trusteeships, 
should, in all cases where a bank or trust company is named in a will as 
executor or trustee, or is named in some fiduciary agreement as trustee, con-
sult with some representative of the Trust Department of such bank or 
trust company with reference to the terms of the will, or other instruments, 
so far as it creates trusteeships or e.xecutorships. 
"Second. When a client indicates to a member of the Bar his desire or 
intention to name a bank or trust company as e.xecutor or trustee under 
his will, the member of the Bar should not discourage or influence the 
client against the use of a bank or trust company in acting in such capacity." 
The success of the method of cooperation and agreement, when 
applied to all types of lay agencies, depends largely upon the ex-
tent to which they have been organized into 1·epresentative, 
responsible associations which stimulate in their members a high 
consciousness of the ethical obligations of their callings. 
Lawyers are already organized into associations provided with 
general codes of conduct aml influenced by professional tradi-
tions. Nevertheless, some of them, including influential members 
of the bar,114 are aiding laymen to practice law illegally, and are 
thus themselves· guilty of unprofessional conduct.m In some 
instances these lawyers are in complete ignorance of the unpro-
fessional character of their acts. In others they are ,,·ell in-
formed but salve their consciences by arguing that they c..1.nnot 
give up such lucrative business until others do so. This break-
down in professional morale, especially among the leaders of the 
bar, has had an unfortunate effect upon the rank and file of 
attorneys, many of whom have resorted to such declQ.sse prac-
tices as ambulance chasing in order to procure business. "If 
gold rust, what shall iron do?" "When unprofessional methods 
of obtaining business are mentioned, trust company lawyers 
mean the bankruptcy ring, the bankruptcy lawyer means the 
ambulance chaser, the ambulance chaser points at the lawyer 
whose retainers are sent him by the trust company.'' 11() \\Tlrile 
a large number of attorneys have been disciplined because of un-
ethical bankruptcy practices, advertising or ambulance chasing, 
the instances of disciplinary proceedings for illegal practice of 
the law are comparatively 1·are. AU the canons of professional 
ethics should be applied to all members of the bar. Otherwise the 
legal fraternity should frankly admit that these canons are out-
114 See Roberts, The UnlawfUl Practice of Law (1931), 24 LAWYER & 
BANKER 80. ' 
us Supra note 53; In re Otterness, supra note 32; Matter of Pace, supriZ 
note 45; In re Gill, 104 Wash. 160, 176 Pac. 11 (1918). See Bu.,-ton v. 
Lietz, supra note 70, at 832. 
ns Jackson, Function of the Trust- Company in the Field of the Latv 
(1929) 52 N. Y. S. B. A. REP. 142, 150. 
\\<l~O 
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worn and obsolete. There is no "conceivable difference between 
€mploying John Doe, your own clerk, as a runner for business and 
employing 'John Doe, Inc., Collection Agency'" 117 or Bank Ol' 
Trust Company, for the same purpose. 
If the bar expects any cooperation from the public in the 
-elimination of the illegal practice of the law it must impartially 
discipline its delinquent members, raise the standards for ad· 
mission to the bar and limit the number of those admitted to the 
actual needs of society. The leaders of the bar are already con· 
scious of the short-comings of their colleagues in the profession 
and of the necessity for radical improvements in the administra· 
tion of justice.U8 From the point of view of lay education, how· 
-ever, perhaps too much emphasis has been placed on these 
features of the present situation. The difficulties of the problem 
not attributable to the bar but inherent in democratic govern· 
ment, in which courts and the bar are essential elements, should 
also be stressed if the public judgment upon the status and impor· 
tance of the professional practice .of the law is to be well·bal· 
anced.119 
117 COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION (1924) 227. 
ns Improvement of the administration of justice has been suggested ns 
a method of eliminating unauthorized practice of the law. See Shinn, 
How to Deal with the Unlawful Practice of Law (1931) 1 17 A. B. A • 
.JouR. 98; Klein, Sell the Legal Profession (1927), 2 CALIF. S. B. J'oun. 74. 
119 See Manton, "Popularizing" the Law and '1Legalizing" tho News 
{1931), 65 U. S. L. REV. 419. 
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